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


24 January 1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN




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Turkey: Despite recent moves toward a return to civil government, which included the establishment of a Constituent Assembly on 6 January, the situation in Turkey remains unstable. The military regime of the Committee of National Union (CNU) which overthrew the Menderes government last May still lacks unanimity of purpose, full loyalty of the military establishment, and popular confidence. Fourteen ultra-nationalist officers who were ousted from the CNU in mid-November and dispersed to foreign diplomatic posts apparently

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retain a degree of military and civilian support within Turkey. The two-month-old trial of members of the pre-revolution government has failed to promote either popular condemnation of those on trial or popular support for the government. Meanwhile, the Turkish economy remains sluggish, largely through lack of public confidence, and continues to be dependent on substantial foreign economic aid, which the Turks believe their Western allies should provide. Unless there is marked improvement in the economic situation, Turkey may accept some economic assistance repeatedly offered by the USSR, provided it does not inhibit Turkey's political freedom of action.

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[redacted]
[redacted] West Germany - Poland: Berthold Beitz, general manager of the Krupp industrial enterprises, has arrived in Warsaw for further discussion of the possibilities of improving West German - Polish relations. Adenauer, who wants to appear "flexible" on East-West relations in an election year, has, according to Beitz, authorized him to negotiate the establishment of a West German trade mission in Warsaw--possibly one having certain consular functions. Beitz returned from a similar trip last month convinced that the Poles are willing to establish diplomatic ties without insisting on immediate West German recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as Poland's western border. Poland, however, continues to insist on full diplomatic ties rather than the gradual improvement of relations favored by Adenauer. [redacted]
(Backup, Page 2)

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[REDACTED]

*Argentina-USSR: Argentina intends to ask the USSR to reduce the size of its embassy in Buenos Aires from the present total of 42 to 20 within the next three months. Notes will be sent later to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria requesting reductions ranging from one third to one half of the present legation staffs. Argentina, concerned about Communist penetration in Latin America, appears determined to press its request. When a suggestion along these lines was made to the Soviet and Polish missions last November, it was rejected as "inconvenient." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Bonn Seeks Improvement of Relations With Poland

[Negotiations for improved West German relations with Poland seem to be under way. Berthold Beitz, general manager of the Krupp industrial enterprises, says he has been authorized by Chancellor Adenauer to negotiate the establishment of a West German trade mission in Warsaw--possibly one having consular functions. Beitz arrived in Warsaw on 22 January.]

[After a conversation with Polish Premier Cyrankiewicz during a visit to Warsaw last month, Beitz returned to Bonn convinced that the Poles are willing to establish diplomatic ties without insisting on immediate West German recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as Poland's western border. The boundary question and the so-called "Hallstein doctrine" by which Bonn refuses to have diplomatic relations with any country other than the USSR which recognizes East Germany have been the major stumbling blocks to an improvement of relations between Bonn and Warsaw.]

[A similar attempt to improve relations in 1958-59 failed because of Warsaw's insistence on immediate resumption of full diplomatic ties rather than following the step-by-step procedure desired by Adenauer. Although Beitz maintains that Premier Cyrankiewicz indicated a willingness to agree to exchange permanent trade missions as a first step, Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki and other diplomatic officials have continued to insist on full diplomatic relations.]

[The undersecretary in the West German Foreign Ministry informed American officials in Bonn that Adenauer had not raised the question of a trade mission with the Foreign Ministry and that he believed the chancellor would move cautiously in an election year to avoid alienating the expellees and refugees who make up about one fifth of the population. Adenauer, however, may be willing to make at least a gesture in order to convince the German public, as well as his allies, that he can]

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[be flexible in dealing with the East and that he is not an obstacle to an international detente.]

[redacted]

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[redacted] publicly taking a "positive attitude" toward attempts to improve relations with Poland in hopes of removing the impression that the refugees are "disturbers of the peace" in East-West relations. German businessmen have long sought to expand formerly lucrative Eastern markets. The Poles have expressed strong interest in West German industrial products and also wish to increase exports of raw material and agricultural products to West Germany. At present, trade with Poland amounts to less than one percent of all West German foreign trade.]

[redacted] statements by Polish leaders have been extremely cautious on the question of a rapprochement with Bonn, but there are indications that negotiations are proceeding on the Foreign Trade Ministry level in the establishment of economic relations while playing down the political problems involved.]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

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